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ABSTRACT 
The paper is an enquiry into civil military relations and leadership crisis in 21
st
 century Africa with 
emphasis on Mauritania, Guinea, Niger and Mali .Results from data collected over a forty-seven year 
period revealed that the countries under review witnessed fifty-five coups. These alarming numbers of 
coups have continued unabated in the light of notable theorizations by scholars, that military 
organizations are primarily servants of the state.  Contrarily, other researchers have argued that 
governments in developing nations lacked the administrative skills to govern their geopolitical entities 
thereby resulting in militarism. While adopting the critical and reconstructive methods of analysis in 
philosophy, the paper identified the quest for self-determination, weak socio-political culture resulting 
from leadership failure, statelessness among others as major consequences of poor CMR in Africa. The 
study submitted that good governance is the antidote to acts of militarism and recommended that African 
leaders should begin to reconsider their approaches to governance. 
Key Words: Colonial Frontiers, Crisis, Leadership, Militarism, Statelessness, Self-determination.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Civil–Military Relations (CMR) describes the relationship between civil societies as a whole and military 
organization or organizations established to protect it. More narrowly, it describes the relationship 
between the civil authority of a given society and its military authority. Studies on civil-military relations 
often rest on the normative assumption that civilian control of the military is preferable to military control 
of the state. The principal problem they contend with is to empirically explain how civilian control over 
the military is established and maintained (Burk, 2002:7-9).  
As an area of study in political science, CMR involves the study and discussion of a diverse range of 
issues including but not limited to the civilian control of the military and vice versa, military 
professionalism, war, civil-military operations, military institutions, and other related subjects. The 
theoretical discussion in this area can include non-state actors (Mandel, 2004:171-201), as well as more 
traditional nation-states. Other research and studies that could be conducted in this area include discerning 
the details of military political attitudes, for instance, voting behavior, (Inbody, 2008; Inbody, 
2009:51) and the potential impact on and interaction with democratic societies (Janowitz, 1982:507-
534), as well as military families.
  
The earliest use of the conception of CMR can be traced to the writings of  Tzu (1971)
 
and  Clausewitz 
(1989). Both writers argued that military organizations were primarily the servants of the state. The 
opinion of these writers notwithstanding, concerns on growing militarism in societies all around the world 
is on the increase. The data in (Appendix1) however, largely indicate a sharp rise in the number of cases 
that have been recorded so far, Studies which indicate direct contradictions to the presumed roles of the 
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military in the society include: Marshall (2004), Huntington (1957) and Janowitz (1960). They were some 
of the first thinkers who published their seminal books on the subject of CMR which effectively brought 
civil-military relations into the academia, particularly in political science and sociology. The versatility 
and notable force with which the Americans adopted Huntington's and Janowitz's theoretical arguments 
have become the basis on which most studies of other nations’ CMR have been conducted. 
The study problematize that states in Africa have witnessed and recorded an unprecedented number of 
coup d’états largely believed to be a consequence of poor and corrupt civilian leadership, among other 
things. This scenario which have created an unhealthy relationship between the military and their civilian 
counterpart. This alarming situation contradicts the basic theories formulated by  Tzu (1971)
 
and Clausewitz (1989) which initially captures the basic roles and relationship of the military as that of 
‘servant-hood relationship’ to the state.  From the frequent coup d’états witnessed in Africa within the 
period stipulated in this study, the reverse seem to be the case. Finer (1988) observes that - contrary to 
Huntington’s (1957) initial assumption on CMR, many governments do not have the administrative skill 
to efficiently govern their geo-political entities. Consequently, “such situations are known to open 
opportunities for military interventions, opportunities that are not as likely in more developed countries” 
(Finer 1988:14). A thorough scrutiny tend to show that leadership failure and weak institutions of 
governance among African states, partly explain the reasons for the prevalence of coup d’états resulting in 
a poor CMR among African states. 
Further studies (Sabelo, J., Ndilovu-Gatsheni & Brilliant Mhlanga, 2013:1-7) also reveal that the high rate 
of coup d’états and leadership crisis recorded in Africa as indicated in (Appendix 1), are largely a 
consequence of the experiences of the ‘Cold War Era’ which took place during the second half of the 
twentieth century between 1960 and 1970. Some of the consequences of this era include the insistence on 
maintaining the sanctity of colonial frontiers (Uti Possidentis) by African leaders. Worthy of note here is 
the strong support of the  Uti Possidentis principle as identified in Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa’s speech, 
of 20
th 
August, 1960:   
On the problem of boundaries, our view is that although in the past some of these were 
created artificially by European powers, which even went so far as to split some 
communities into three parts, each administered by a different colonial power, nevertheless 
these boundaries should be respected and, in the interest of peace must remain the 
recognized boundary units until such a time as the people concerned decide to - on their own 
free will - merge into one unit. We shall discourage any attempt to influence such 
communities by force or through undue pressure to change, since such interference could 
only result in unrest and harm to the overall plan for the future of the great continent (Boyd, 
1979:50). 
Other fallouts of this era as captured by Bereketeab (2013:61-74) include: statelessness factors, elitism 
and particularistic interests of most African leaders, and the factors of political legitimacy in governance 
among African states, as exemplified in the second Sudanese (North-South) civil war from 1983-2005 
and the Darfur crisis (Johnson, 2003, Deng, 2010, Barltrop, 2011); the 1998-2000 Ethiopia-Eritrea war 
(Jacun-Berdal and Plaut, 2004, Negash and Tronvoll, 2000, Abbink, 2003, Lata, 2003) to mention but a 
few. Consequently, the rising wave of militarism and the attendant problems associated with it (leadership 
crisis) have in recent times, given writers and contemporary scholars on CMR and political science, 
reasons to further ponder and extend their studies in the direction of identifying the root causes of these 
various acts of militarism and leadership crisis with a view to proffering solutions to the troubling cases 
of militarism within African states. 
 
CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION 
Civil Military Relations (CMR) 
What is the relationship between civilians (people without arms), the society at large, and the military 
(people with arms) established as a separate armed body in order to protect a society? This question has a 
long history which extends to the very beginnings of military organization in civilian societies. The 
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answer to this question is deeply influenced by national historic sentiments, and traditions. For some 
countries, it depends on the role of the army as a state institution in the given country and the 
subordination of the military to political authorities as defined in laws and constitutional arrangements. 
These factors go a long way in determining how CMR is conceived. 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) however, refers to CMR as “activities by NATO 
Commanders in war directly concerned with the relationship between allied armed forces and the 
government, civil population or agencies of non-NATO countries, where such armed forces are stationed, 
supported or employed” (NATO cited in Omoigui, 2005:1-9). Hernandez cited in Omoigui, 2005:1) 
defined CMR as the balance of power between the military and civilian branches of government.  She 
further stressed that CMR has to do with the supremacy and guidance of the civilian populace over the 
military. It entails full democratic control of the military as it plays its role as the ultimate guarantor of 
national security. Ideally, the military is the servant of the society and it has the monopoly over the means 
of violence in the interest of its citizens in response to popular will and consent.    
Ebo (2005), sees CMR as referring to the totality of relations between the military and society which it 
operates in and of which it is necessarily a part of. It comprises all aspects of the role of the military (as a 
professional, political, social and economic institution) in the entire aspects of national life. CMR also 
involves the attitude of the military towards the civilian society 
Militarism  
Luckham (1998) contends that militarism refers to the pervasiveness in society of symbols, values and 
discourses validating military power and properties of war. Militarism is the product of long and 
entrenched military involvement in politics in which military values and ethos; “immediate effect” 
syndrome and intimidation has replaced civil procedure of dialogue, negotiations and consensus. 
Militarization on the other hand, is a multi-dimensional process through which a number of elements 
like coups and authoritarian governments, the dominance of powerful military and repressive state 
apparatus and arms import and external military intervention becomes linked both to each other and 
more unduly to capital accumulation and  the project of national and international capital (Luckham 
1998).    
Military intervention according to Huntington (1976), is a phenomenon (internal or external) where for 
example, a country could be involved militarily in another country with the purpose of correcting or 
preventing some perceived injustice (peace keeping mission). Such could also take place but on 
humanitarian ground /intervention, where an intervening force aims to aid in a pressing crisis brought 
on by conflict or a natural disaster where there is a need to alleviate famine, structural damage or 
potential social conflict.  
Today in most parts of Africa, the military have intervened in the domestic political activities of the states 
they were expected to protect from external aggression amongst other things. Most of these interventions 
have led to a total take-over of administrative power and leadership, while vesting themselves with the 
responsibility of governing illegitimately, the affairs of the state.  
Leadership 
Stogdill (1974:259) affirmed that “there are many definitions of leadership as there are persons who have 
attempted to define the concept”. The stream of definitions has continued unabated since Stogdill (1974) 
made his observations. Leadership has therefore been defined by some scholars in terms of traits, 
behaviors, influence, interaction patterns, role relationships and occupation of administrative positions. 
Richards and Engle (1986:199-214) have however defined leadership as “that which articulates visions, 
embodying values, and creating the environment within which things can be accomplished” For Jacobs 
and Jaques,(1990:218-295) “Leadership is the process of giving purpose (meaningful direction) to 
collective efforts and causing willing effort to be expended to achieve purpose”. Leadership according to 
House and Adrtya, (1997:409-473) is “the ability of an individual to influence, motivate, and enable 
others to contribute towards the effectiveness and the success of the state or organization as the case may 
be.  
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Most definitions of leadership reflect the assumption that it involves a process whereby intentional 
influence is exerted by one person over other people to guide, structure and facilitate activities and 
relationship in a group, society or organization. The salient points in the forgoing include who exerts 
influence, the intended purpose of the influence, the manner in which the influence is exerted and the 
outcome of the influence intended.  
The notion of leadership for African rulers however, seem to have an entirely different meaning when 
compared to what obtains in other parts of the world. The “sit tight” syndrome of most African leaders, 
for periods as long as thirty years and above as in the case of Muammar Gaddafi of Libya, Mobutu 
Seseseko of Zaire and Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, - leaders whose reign ended in civil crisis and military 
interventions - are typical examples of how most African leaders perceive leadership; as a family right 
that should be passed on from one generation to the other. These factors in most cases have been arguably 
responsible for leadership failure and weak institutions of governance which have become prevalent 
among African states. Consequently, situations like these tend to fuel political illegitimacy in governance 
among African leaders. The need to provide a viable theory of leadership for African leaders becomes 
very essential to this study, in order to correct this anomaly and several dysfunctions in governance. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The Socio-Economic Theory  
The Socio-Economic Theory has Putnam (1967); Agara (2004) and Finer (1975) as some of its major 
proponents. The theory states that when a country’s civilian democracy has failed to develop the 
stagnated social and economic institutions which run the system, the military is often left with no other 
choice than to take over the reins of leadership. In other words, where democratic tenets have failed to be 
the guiding and major modes of operation among the civilian populace - which consequently creates a 
stagnation in all spheres of social and economic institutions, the military most often than not, seize the 
opportunity to intervene with the view to salvage the already deplorable state of the country in question. It 
is plausible to argue based on the data in Appendix 1 that most military interventions recorded were as a 
result of issues arising from social and economic underdevelopment in the countries under review.  
Putnam (1967) hypothesized on the correlation between the social and economic underdevelopment of a 
country and the propensity for military intervention, when he maintained that “the effects of economic 
development stems partly from the increased socio-technical complexity that puts public administrations 
beyond the skills of the armed forces, partly from the civilian opportunities for social mobility which 
economic development opens up, and partly from greater wealth which allows and encourages stable 
civilian government”.  The above position was further strengthened by Agara (2004:290) who posited that 
economic development and industrialization diminishes the possibilities of military interventions in a 
state. Finer (1975:113-115) reiterates the likelihood of decreased military intervention with increased 
socio-economic development such as urbanization and mass education. These arguments by the 
proponents of the socio-economic theory of CMR, to some extent - we will argue - offer explanations for 
the coup d’états and leadership crisis proposed for discussion in this paper.  
Political Development Theory 
Political Development Theory has Huntington (1976); Lieuwen (1962); Finer (1975) and Putnam (1967) 
as some of the major proponents. The underlying argument here is that, where public attachments to 
civilian institutions are strong and firm, military interventions in politics and civilian governments will be 
weak. On the contrary, where the public attachment to meaningful political activities and ideologies are 
weak or non-existent, the military will find credible basis for assuming power (Finer, 1975:21). The basic 
trust of the theory is that “the propensity for military intervention in government decreases with 
increasing popular attention to participation in partisan politics” (Putnam, 1967). 
Appendix 1 presents ample evidence which re-enforces the argument on leadership failure and weak 
institutions of governance in the African states under focus. These weak institutions of government, partly 
explains the very poor state of development in Africa. Weak institutions and low level of political 
development can be explained in the light of recurring military intervention occasioned by frosty CMR. 
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The net effect of these is weak governance and weak public administrative system, culminating in a lack 
of development in Africa, especially in the countries under review: Mauritania, Guinea, Niger and Mali.  
 
THE RELEVANCE OF THE THEORIES TO LEADERSHIP CRISIS IN AFRICA / DISCUSSION 
OF FINDINGS 
The data in appendix 1 highlights the alarming frequency of coup d’états occasioned by a failure of 
leadership and the nonexistent viable institutions of governance in the African states. The same results 
reaffirms the arguments supporting the claims that socio – economic factors and political development 
factors are some of the major CMR theories exerting influence on leadership crisis in Africa. The political 
development theory for instance, explains why members of the armed forces in the countries under 
review, continue to intervene in the affairs of civilian governments.  Further analysis of the data collected 
reveals that most civilian governments continue to fail to transit from one democratically elected 
government to another as a result of the numerous violent clashes which have become a major feature of 
the electoral processes of the countries under review. We shall now closely consider special cases of poor 
CMR in the countries under review.  
Mauritania 
Mauritania’s history following the end of one-party rule in 1978 was highlighted by five successful coups 
out of twelve known incidences of coups: 1978, 1980, 1984, 2005, and 2008 (Appendix 1). While the 
coups of 1978 and 1984 installed military regimes, the 2005 coup was motivated by increasing domestic 
tension under the rule of Colonel Maaouya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya (Akinterinwa, 2008:20). This tension 
stemmed partly from Ould Taya’s limited tolerance for democratization. The coup leaders organized open 
elections, and a civilian president was elected in 2007. Feelings within the military leadership which 
indicated that the civilian regime was politically weak, especially in the face of a perceived Islamist and 
jihadist threat, prompted the coup in August, 2008. The leader of that coup, General Mohamed Ould 
Abdel Aziz, had been a key participant in the 2005 coup. In 2009, the junta organized Presidential 
elections. Abdel Aziz ran as a civilian candidate and won. He remains in power till today (Thurston, 
2012:6). Here we see the socio-political theory of CMR strongly at play.  
Guinea 
Out of fourteen recorded instances of alleged coup plots in Guinea, three of the coups were successful. 
The coup of 1984 took place at the demise of independence-era leader, President Sekou Toure, and 
another in December 2008, at the demise of President Lansana Conte, who came to power in the coup of 
1984 (Appendix 1). The junta installed in 2008 was led by Captain Moussa Dadis Camara. Camara 
promised that elections would take place and that he would not stand, but tensions rose as his promises 
came to appear hollow and his behaviour became erratic. Consequently, in September 2009, soldiers 
brutally cracked down on an opposition rally in the capital Conakry. Then, in December 2009, one of 
Camara’s guards shot him in the head. The junta leader missed death by whiskers. He was flown to 
Morocco and later to Burkina Faso. He was no longer permitted to re-enter Guinea. Power passed to 
General Sekouba Konate, who oversaw a two-round election in June/November 2010. The elections were 
marred by violence and allegations of fraud. The winner, long-time opposition leader Alpha Conde, is still 
the President (Marshall, 2004:4).  
Niger  
In the case of Niger,  out of eight recorded instances of coup plots, four successful coup d’états were  
recorded: the 1974 coup that overthrew independence-era President Hamani Diori; a 1996 coup that 
installed Colonel Ibrahim Mainassara, after several attempts at installing civilian governments; the 1999 
assassination of Mainassara by his bodyguards, who then organized civilian elections which was won by 
President Mamadou Tandja; and the February 2010 coup that ousted Tandja after he amended the 
constitution and remained in power beyond his original two-term limit (Appendix 1). The 2010 coup led 
by Colonel Salou Djibo, exemplified continuities with the 1999 coup. Djibo’s junta quickly organized 
civilian elections. The two-round contest held in January/March 2011, was won by opposition leader and 
current President Mahamadou Issoufou (Akinterinwa, 2008:20).  
Wogu & Ibietan ... Int. J.  Innovative Soc. Sc. & Hum. Res. 2 (1): 48-61, 2014 
 
 
Ok 
   
53 
 
Mali                                                                
From the 16
th
 of January 2012, several insurgent groups fought against the Malian government for 
independence or greater autonomy for Northern Mali, an area known as Azawad. ‘The National 
Movement for the Liberation of Azawad’ (MNLA), an organization fighting to make Azawad an 
independent homeland for the Tuaregs people, had taken control of the region by 2012.  On the 22
nd
 of  
March 2012, President Amadou Toumani Touré was ousted in a coup d'état over his handling of the crisis 
in his country, a month before presidential election took place in the country. 
Mutinous soldiers, under the name ‘National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and 
State' (CNRDR), led by Captain Amadou Sanogo, the Chairman of the Committee took control and 
suspended the constitution of Mali (Associated Press, 2012:8). In a television broadcast, the day after the 
coup was staged, he announced that the junta had suspended Mali's constitution and taken control of the 
nation. He also cited Touré's alleged poor handling of the insurgency and the lack of equipment for the 
Malian Army, among other socio-economic reasons, as justification for the overthrow of government.  As 
a consequence of the instability following the coup, Mali's three largest Northern cities: 
Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu, were overrun by the rebels in three consecutive days (Ahmed and Callimachi, 
2012). On 5
th
 April 2012, after the capture of Douentza, the MNLA announced that it had accomplished 
its goals and called off its offensive. The following day, it proclaimed Azawad's independence from Mali 
(Al Arabiya, 2012).   
Statelessness and CMR in Mali:  
‘Everyone has the right to a nationality. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied 
the right to change his nationality’ (UDHR, 1948:15). The article of the Universal Declaration of Hman 
Rights confers upon every individual in the world, the right to have a legal connection with a State, 
Citizenship or Nationality. Not only does this right provide people with a sense of identity, it also entitles 
individuals to the protection of a state and many other civil and political rights. Indeed, Citizenship has 
been described as “the right to have rights.” (Achiron, 2005:2). Statelessness therefore is a legal concept 
describing the lack of any nationality; it is the absence of a recognized link between an individual and 
any state. A stateless person is therefore someone who is "not considered as a national by any state under 
the operation of its law" (Wiki, 2013). In other words, a stateless person has no citizenship or nationality. 
As a matter of international law, citizenship and nationality are congruous, although there may be 
differences between the two concepts in domestic law. 
The independence of Mali in 1962 saw a forceful unification of more than two totally different groups of 
people among which are the Tuaregs, also known as the National Movement for the Liberation of 
Azawad (NMLA) and the tribes and people of Southern Mali, who have opposing tribes and religion to 
those of their counterparts in the North (Fonbaustier, 
2012). The Tuaregs find this amalgamation, a forceful 
act of unification which swallowed up their territory 
and identity, thereby rendering them stateless as a 
people, a people totally under the control of another 
state. They therefore see their quest and struggle for 
the independent state of Azawad as a mere expression 
of their fundamental human rights as contained in the 
UDHR article cited above. In states where these 
clashes and crisis are initiated by racism, nationalism, 
ethnicity, tribalism, homophobia, xenophobia, 
genocides, religious wars, violence and other phobias 
and conflicts abound, studies have shown (Zartman, 
2011:11-15), Sabelo et al, (2013:2-4), that governance 
of any sort - whether civilian or military – can be very 
difficult or near impossible to achieve.  
Can a multiethnic or a multinational state survive in a 
 
Map showing the full extent of rebel-held territories in 
(Jan. 2013) before it was re-taken by Malian and French 
forces. Wikipedia, 2013.                                                                                      
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state where conflicting groups are clamoring for power? The rapid collapse of ethnic or nationalist based 
conflicts simmering in such widely separated countries like Rwanda, Sudan, Nigeria and the countries 
under review here, demonstrates the durability of ethnic awareness as basis for political tension (Welch 
1995:108-109) The existence of either small or large ethnic and tribal groups usually in the minority or 
majority have also been identified as one of the fallouts of the arbitrary divisions of the African states by 
colonial powers.  (Olayode, 2013:290-295) & (Welch, 1995:108-109). The interplay and tussle for power 
and the control of resources for development in the state by these multiethnic and multinational groups - a 
phenomenon which is known to exist in both the civilian and in the military ranks – is also noted as 
another pertinent factor at the root of leadership crisis, which often translates to poor CMR for most states 
in the African context.  Where there is a prevalence of such struggles, it makes governance for the 
civilians and their military counterparts too difficult as have been inferred by Boahen, in Sabelo et al. 
(2013: 1:3). 
The long battle still being fought by the (MNLA), an organization fighting to make Azawad an 
independent homeland for the Tuaregs people in the North, against the people in the South for over four 
decades now, is a typical example of a state with a prevalence of multiethnic and multinational tribes and 
cultures seeking self-determination and identity under the article UDHR (1948) referred to above. This 
further explains why there was crisis in Mali.  All efforts to successfully suppress the rebels for over four 
decades have failed because the Azawad people believe they are fighting for one just cause: “the right of a 
people to determine their own political status and economic, social and cultural development… the right 
to an independent state and therefore sovereignty (Knop, 2002:108-109), which culminates in regaining 
their long lost and scattered identity and nationhood status,.a status which was lost by the amalgamation, 
which also united different people of multiethnic tribes and culture in Mali.  This very fact and scenario 
lends credence to the comment by Boahen, (2013) when he exclaimed at the difficulty involved in trying 
as a government, to make true nation-states out of bastardised multiethnic and multinational peoples of 
various tribes and tongues in Africa (Sabelo et al 2013:1-3).    
It is on record that the civilian government of Amadou Toumani Touré was ousted in a coup d'état over 
his mishandling of the crisis in his country and for his inability to quell the insurgence tearing his country 
apart. The military was therefore forced to take over power and to restore and reunite the country which 
the civilian government could no longer manage, among other socio economic reasons which were given 
for staging the coup (Associated Press, 2012:8). The rebels however proved to have been too tough for 
the Malian military, who could not suppress the activities of the rebel group. The group seeking self-
determination had, in the space of a few days, taken over the major Northern cites of 
Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu. It only took further acts of militarism (the combined forces of the French Army 
and the AU forces) to reverse the country to the status quo and restore the country to civilian rule. Other 
notable examples in this category include: the second Sudanese North-South civil war, 1983-2005, and 
the Darfur case (Johnson, 2003, Denga, 2010, Barltrop, 2011); the 1998-2000 Ethiopia-Eritrea war 
(Jacun-Berdal and Plaut, 2004, Negash and Tronvoll, 2000, Abbink, 2003, Lata, 2003), the cases of 
military interventions in Mauritania, Guinea, and Niger (Thurston, 2012), as earlier discussed. The issues 
discussed under the statelessness factor therefore have strong implications in explaining poor CMR 
among African states.  
The Sanctity of Colonial frontiers (Uti possidetis)  
This factor, many writers (Bonchuk, 2013:323-329); Nsogura (2002:3); Lord Curzon (1902:23); and 
Boggs (1940:97); have argued, exerts one of the greatest influences on leadership crisis in Africa. The 
point being made here is associated with the principle of self-determination which allows an individual or 
a group of persons, the privilege or freedom to live their lives as they wished, wherever they chose to do 
so and within a given context. Uti possidetis (Latin expression for "as you possess") however, is “a 
principle in international law which holds that territory and other property remains with its possessor at 
the end of a conflict, unless otherwise provided for by treaty; if such a treaty doesn't include conditions 
regarding the possession of property and territory taken during the war, then the principle of Uti 
possidetis will prevail (USLegal, 2010). Originating in Roman law, the phrase is derived from the Latin 
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expression Uti possidetis, ita possideatis, meaning "may you continue to possess such as you do possess" 
(literary: "as you possess, thus may you possess") Bogss (1940:79). This principle enables a belligerent 
party to claim and lay hold to a territory and a people which it had acquired by war. It means that where 
this principle is adopted, certain individuals who were products of such conflicts – resulting from forceful 
amalgamations by colonial masters at the Berlin Conference, who did not take into considerations, the 
various multiethnic and multinational natures of the groups of persons involved in the unholy marriage. 
By implication, all the groups of persons involved in this division become automatically alienated without 
an identity in this new country which they now find themselves in. A scenario enforced by the principle 
which insist that such people – as in the case of ‘The National Movement for the Liberation of 
Azawad’ (MNLA), and other groups discussed in the paper - no longer have the rights to reverting to 
what the status quo was before the conflicts ensured. 
More recently, the principle has been used in a modified form to establish the frontiers of newly 
independent states following decolonization, by ensuring and insisting that the frontiers followed the 
original boundaries of the old colonial territories from where / they emerged (Hensel, et al, 2006). This 
study however, finds this act very inimical and detrimental to sister African states who have found no 
reasons whatsoever to continue to co-exist with each other. The recent stories of the Republic of Eretria 
which was carved out of Ethiopia, South Sudan from Sudan and more recently, Azawad from Mali before 
they were forcefully – via military action – denied the rights to autonomy, all bear evidence to the violent 
bloody civil wars that could take place among different ethnic and religious groups, leading to crisis of 
various sorts between civilian governments and the military who are often caught between the divide. 
These calamities, this paper argues, is associated with the continued adoption of the principle of Uti 
possidetis by African leaders.  
In contemporary times, groups which constitute minorities in their states have evoked the rights to self-
determination in their demand for autonomy – or in some cases, secession – and have resorted to violence 
to pursue their aims. These groups typically justify their claims for self-determination as a way to end 
years of repression and human right violations by the majority ethnic groups or the central government. 
This paper however notes that the absence of a precise definition of what the right to self-determination 
entails has left the international community, and the states concerned without guiding principles with 
which to respond (Hussein & Sally, 2001:9-11). Many of the multiethnic and multinational tribal conflicts 
in Africa, leading to weak political government structures in the states affected, are as a result of nations 
seeking greater degrees of self-determination within a larger territorially based state. These conflicts as 
witnessed in Mali, makes governing for both the civilians and various military regimes difficult if not 
impossible.  
At present, tension exists between the right to self-determination and the principle of territorial integrity 
of sovereign states. Self-determination which is predicated on the notion of giving individuals more 
control of their lives could also imply claims to independent sovereign states. This conflicts with the long 
standing reckoning that international borders are inviolable (De Silver Wijeyeratne & Beard, 2010:12-13). 
This paper therefore acknowledges that in dealing with the issues of sovereignty and self -determination 
in Mali and in the rest of African states under review, cognizance should be placed on emotional issues in 
both contemporary African and human rights debate. The legal interpretation of self-determination and 
the place of the individual versus the group in human rights discourses remain items of serious 
contention. This is because ethnic groups seeking to empower themselves as witnessed in Mali and in 
other states under review, often collide with the desire of the state to maintain centralized control either 
under the civilian or a military regime. Thus pluralism, far from being viewed as an essential building 
block and a safe guard for competitive democracy, is perceived as a weapon of potential destruction 
(Olusola, 2013:290-291). 
Consequently, it is further arguable that strong focus on the state as a core and only unit of analysis by 
most political analysts and leaders of governments are inadequate for the realities of contemporary 
African politics. Similarly, trying to sustain policies based on unreconstructed, traditional, ethnic and 
linguistic based notions of nation - states nationalism, as discussed earlier, will also lead to unbridled 
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ethno-nationalism with painful social, political and economic consequences. Where these scenarios exist 
in any state, a poor and unstable CMR becomes the order of the day.   
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
Conclusion 
The paper identified and discussed ‘Socio-economic’ and the ‘Political development’ theory of CMR as 
applicable to current African political leadership situation. While the socio-economic theory holds that ‘in 
a country where democratic tenets failed to be the guiding and major modus operandi among the civilian 
populace, the military, more often than not, seize the opportunity to intervene with a view to salvage the 
already deplorable state of the country in question’. The political development theory on the other hand 
holds that ‘where public attachments to civilian institutions are strong and firm, military interventions in 
politics and civilian governments will be weak. On the contrary, where public attachment to meaningful 
political activities and ideologies are weak or nonexistent in some cases, military intervention in politics 
will find scope both in manner and in substance’.  The scenario in the countries under review espoused 
the relevance of these theories.   
The study identified the earnest quest for self-determination among multiethnic and subnational groups 
who have found themselves entangled in states which have subsumed their identity, culture, religion and 
freedom. In states where they could no longer determine their own political status and economic, social 
and cultural development. Internal crises among the plural and disparate segments of those artificial 
nation-states become inevitable. These where some of the pertinent factors which the paper identified to 
be at the root of the many violent political crisis which in turn, basically made a stable and mutual CMR 
in the countries under review quite difficult. 
Recommendations 
Given that the problem of self-determinism is one of the major root causes of political violence and 
instability of civilian governments, leading to military interventions and counter coups especially where 
the rank and file of the armed forces are known to also experience one form of alienation or the other 
arising from inequitable division of resources for development in their various multiethnic and 
multinational groups, it becomes very imperative that leaders of AU and UN General Assembly should 
begin to seriously consider the implementation of Article 2 of the UN charter which states that: “All 
peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political 
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development (UN Charter, 1960:Article 2). 
Having identified weak political cultures and the non-existent basic institutions of governance in states as 
part of the causes of violent political and ethnic crises, culminating in poor CMR in the countries under 
review, this paper submits that the time is right for Africans  and African leaders to cultivate and entrench 
democratic practices and institutions which will ensure that neither the majority nor the minority in a state 
are threatened with permanent exclusion from power and resources for development. Thus democratic 
societies must develop the institutions, resources, and the flexibility in the long term to aid peaceful 
management of conflicts, since it has inherent potentials for conflict resolutions and provides non-violent 
method for selecting leaders. With the understanding that democratic practices in the 21
st
 century has the 
fundamental aim of affirming and asserting the sovereignty of the people, and ensure that one is imbued 
with equal power to determine how individual destiny is to be managed.    
Finally, there is the urgent need for African states to embark on a massive reorientation of the armed 
forces.  The need to revamp their roles in the pertinent project of nation building in the 21
st 
century,
,
 
alongside their traditional duties of protection and preservation of territorial integrity of their nation state, 
cannot be overemphasized at this time.       
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Guide to Appendix  
 Please note that under the caption “Success”, we have used four different numbers (1, 2, 3 & 4) to 
represent the following: Successful Coups (1), Attempted Coups (2), Plotted Coups (3), and 
Alleged Coups (4) 
 For brevity, this study has analyzed just the records of coup d’états in four countries in Africa, 
they include: Guinea, Mauritania, Niger, and Mali. The coup in these four countries represents 
13.28% of the entire coups recorded within the specified period in the entire continent of Africa. 
 In all, 40 known cases of coups or attempted coups d’états were recorded as represented here 
which spanned a period of 47 years. Guinea had 13 known cases of coup d’états, Mali had 9 
known cases, Mauritania had 12 known cases, Niger had 6 known cases. 
 Coup Leaders must seize and hold central authority for at least two weeks to be considered 
“successful” coups d’états. The names of coup leaders listed above are those contained in reports, 
accusations  and / or subsequent trials.     
 The date of the coup is the beginning date for successful or attempted coups and the date of 
announcement for discovered coup plots and coup allegations. 
 An entry of “999” under deaths indicates that no casualty figures were given and there may have 
been no deaths associated with this event, an entry of “998” indicates that no casualty  
 figures were given but there were some indications in the reports that casualties did occur during 
/or in the immediate aftermath of the event.   
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Appendix 1: Military Coups In Africa, 1946 - 2012  
S/N Country Month  Day Year Success Leaders Death 
1 Guinea 11 9 1965 4 
unspecified 5 
2 Guinea 2 16 1968 3 
National Liberation Front of Guinea 0 
3 Guinea 3 10 1969 3 
M. Foderba Keita and Col. Kaman Diaby 0 
4 Guinea 11 22 1970 2 
Guinea exiles in Guinea-Bissau 998 
5 Guinea 1 15 1984 4 
incl. Maj. Fedeba Keita, Col. Kaman Diaby 999 
6 Guinea 4 3 1984 1 
incl. Col. Lansana Conte 998 
7 Guinea 7 4 1985 2 
Col. Traore 0 
8 Guinea 2 2 1996 2 
unspecified 0 
9 Guinea 3 17 1997 4 
unspecified 18 
10 Guinea 11 30 2003 4 
unspecified 0 
11 Guinea 12   2008 1 Captain Moussa Dadis Camara. 
0 
12 Guinea 9   2009 4 
unspecified 998 
13 Guinea 12   2009 1 General Sekouba Konate 
998 
14 Mali 11 19 1963 1 
Lt. Moussa Traore 
999 
15 Mali 8 12 1969 4 
unspecified 
0 
16 Mali 2   1978 4 
Col. Kissima Doudkara, Tiecoro Bagayoko 
0 
17 Mali 12 30 1980 3 
Karim Sissoko 
0 
18 Mali 3 26 1991 1 
Lt. Col. Amadou Toumani Toure 
999 
19 Mali 7 14 1991 2 
Maj. Lamine Diabira 
0 
20 Mali 12 9 1993 3 
Lt. Col. Oumar Diallo 
0 
21 Mali 10 27 1996 3 
Mady Diallo 
0 
22 Mali 3 22 2012 1 
Captain Amadou Sanogo and the Committee 
(CNRDR),  0 
23 Mauritania 7 10 1978 
1 Lt. Col. Ould Salek 0 
24 Mauritania 1 4 1980 
1 Lt. Col. Mohamed Khouna Ould Heydalla 999 
25 Mauritania 3 16 1981 
2 Lt. Col. Ould Sidi, Lt. Col. Abdelkader 28 
26 Mauritania 2 6 1982 
2 Col. Ould Salek, et al 0 
27 Mauritania 12 12 1984 
1 Col. Moaouia Taya 0 
28 Mauritania 10 22 1987 
3 Lt. Ba Seydi, Lt. Sarr Amadou, Lt. Sy Saidou 0 
29 Mauritania 11   1990 
2 unspecified 0 
30 Mauritania 10   1995 
4 unspecified 0 
31 Mauritania 6 8 2003 
2 Maj. Salah Quld Henena, Abderrahmane 15 
32 Mauritania   10 2004 
3 Quld Mini, Mohammed Quld 
Cheikhna,Mohammed Quld Salek 
0 
33 Mauritania 8 3 2005 
1 "Knights of Change" Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, 0 
34 Mauritania 8   2008 
1 General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, Col. Ely 
Quld Mohamed Vall; Military Council for Justice 
and Democracy,  
0 
35 Niger     1974 
1 unspecified  
36 Niger 
10 5 1983 2 Mahamane Sidikou, Lt. Amadou Dumarou 0 
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Source: Marshall, (2004).  Conflict trends in Africa (Mashall) Coups d’état in Africa (1946-2012). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 Niger 1 27 1996 1 Col. Ibrahim Barre Mainassara 2 
38 Niger 
1   1998 3 Hama Amadou 0 
39 Niger 
4 9 1999 1 Maj. Dauda Malam Wanke 5 
40 Niger 
2  2010 1 Colonel. Salou Djibo 998 
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